| FOURTEEN YEARS AFTER a powerful rebellion spread fear and destruction |
| throughout the nation of Peru, the commanding general of the Peruvian |
| Army, Otto Guibovich, provided the ominous warning: “If we don’t do |
| something they will grow and we will realize we have our own FARC (Fuerzas |
| Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia).”1 Sendero Luminoso (SL) conducted |
| a violent campaign of rural guerrilla war and urban terrorism from 1980 to |
| 1995; however, its growth and expansion seemed to vanish in an instant with |
| the capture of its leader, Abimael Guzmán. The rapid disintegration of SL was |
| cited as an example of successful counterinsurgency, but now rising casualties |
| and violence caused by the formerly dormant group have called those conclusions |
| into question. While the importance of the capture of SL’s leadership |
| is incontrovertible, recent events indicate that the underlying problems that |
| fueled the Sendero insurgency remain. The Peruvian government must use a |
| combination of enemy- and population-focused strategies to defeat SL and |
produce lasting stability.
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